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Even though tariff rates fell throughout the late 1970s and 1980s, there is grow- 
ing consensus that the overall level of protection in the United States rose dur- 
ing this period. For instance, Bhagwati (1988,43) states, “The downward trend 
in trade restrictions resulting from declining tariffs was rudely interrupted in 
the mid-1970s:’  and Nivola (1993) points out that between 1975 and 1985 the 
volume of U.S. import trade affected by some form of trade barriers doubled. 
In fact, from a historical perspective, what is surprising is not that the long 
postwar period of trade liberalization was interrupted (at least temporarily) but 
that the era of trade liberalization lasted so long.’ 
Rather, what is unusual about the recent rise in protectionism  is the form 
that it has taken. In earlier years, increased demand for protection  was met 
with  comprehensive tariff  bills. By contrast, the  recent rise in protection  is 
almost entirely due to administered protection and nontariff  barriers such as 
voluntary  export restraints  (VERs),  which  differ in several important  ways 
from traditional tariff protection. First of  all, the modern tools of  protection 
are typically more subtle and less transparent than tariffs, falling in the grey 
area between GATT-consistent and GATT-inconsistent protection. This ambi- 
guity explains why the modern tools are so popular since it allows countries 
considerable discretion over when and how to implement these policies. Is a 
health standard that outlaws the sale of beef from cattle injected with growth 
hormones truly based on concern for public safety, or is it simply an attempt 
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to reduce the amount of imported beef? Are budget cuts that significantly re- 
duce the staff at customs offices a sincere effort to manage the federal deficit 
or a veiled attempt to raise the cost of exporting into the US. market? Is an 
industry’s fall in profits and sales due to increasingly efficient foreign competi- 
tors, or is this injury due to dumped imports? 
A second key characteristic-and  the one that is the focus of this paper- 
is that the modern instruments are usually not comprehensive. Protection via 
VERs and the unfair  trade  statutes  is product  and country  specific. For in- 
stance, the  198  1 automobile VER with Japan neither  restricted  automobiles 
from South Korea nor (initially) restricted light trucks or utility vehicles from 
Japan. One might expect that the restriction on Japanese automobiles would 
lead to an increase in the imports of Japanese trucks and utility  vehicles and 
South Korean automobiles.2 Similarly, an antidumping  (AD) duty levied on 
carbon steel pipes from France is not levied on carbon steel pipes from Ger- 
many. One would expect that an antidumping  duty levied on a single source 
would cause exports from the named country  (i.e., France) to fall and those 
from nonnamed countries to increase. 
The goal of this paper is to begin to address the issue of how the country- 
specific nature of AD protection  affects its use and effectiveness. I find evi- 
dence that AD protection  induces substantial trade diversion from named to 
nonnamed countries. There is also evidence that, the larger the estimated duty, 
the larger the amount of diversion. Because the magnitude of import diversion 
is found to be quite large, the results also suggest that AD duties are less re- 
strictive than the domestic industry might expect. Nonetheless, AD duties are 
valuable since trade is restrained by more in cases resulting in duties than in 
cases that  are rejected.  More generally, AD actions  are valuable  since they 
induce substantial increases in import prices-by  both named and nonnamed 
countries. 
The paper will proceed as follows. In section 7.1, I provide background on 
the rise of U.S. AD activity and discuss related research. In section 7.2, I pres- 
ent data on the trade effects of  AD actions, with particular  emphasis on the 
magnitude of import diversion from named to nonnamed countries. Given that 
I find import diversion to be substantial, the aggressive U.S. use of AD law 
has a peculiar side effect-countries  that are active in the categories  under 
investigation (but not named) will benefit from the AD sanctions on rivals. In 
other words, the diversion of imports implies that domestic producers are not 
the only firms that benefit from an AD action. Countries such as South Korea 
and Brazil, both of which are frequently named in AD petitions, may neverthe- 
less be  net  beneficiaries  of AD actions since they also gain from sanctions 
on other countries. This issue of which countries have experienced the most 
contraction of trade and which have experienced the most expansion as a result 
2. For analyses of  the VER on Japanese automobiles, see Feenstra (1984, 1987) and Dinopoulos 
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of  U.S. AD actions is discussed in section 7.3. A few concluding comments 
are made in section 7.4. 
7.1  Background 
7.1.1  The Rise of AD Law 
During the  1980s, there were more cases filed under AD law (almost five 
hundred) than under all the other trade statutes combined (Baldwin and Stea- 
gall 1994; Hansen and Prusa 1995). AD law, however, is far from an overnight 
sensation. In fact, AD law is one of the oldest of U.S. trade statutes. The emer- 
gence of AD law as the preeminent trade statute is the result of many revisions 
and amendments  over the years; the  vast majority of the amendments  were 
geared toward expanding its applicability and increasing the likelihood of an 
AD case resulting in duties. Prior to 1958, for instance, AD actions were ex- 
tremely rare. Then, in 1958, Congress amended the rules governing the way in 
which the dumping margin was calculated, and petition filings increased: about 
twenty  to twenty-five petitions  were filed per year between  1958 and  1973; 
however, the rejection rate was quite high (on average, only two or three cases 
per  year  would  result  in duties).  In  1974, AD law  was  again  significantly 
amended: the definition of dumping was broadened to include sales below cost, 
and strict time limits on the length of the investigation were imposed. Follow- 
ing the  1974 amendments, AD filings jumped by 50 percent.  Despite these 
changes, the rejection rate remained around 85 percent. 
Frustrated by the lack of protection afforded by the law, industries lobbied 
Congress to make the law more likely to result in duties. These lobbying efforts 
were manifested in the Trade Agreement Act of 1979, which contained numer- 
ous significant changes to AD law. Among them, the power to investigate less 
than fair value was transferred from the Department of Treasury to the Depart- 
ment of Commerce, use of  “best  information  available” was approved, and 
time limits on cases were shortened. As a result of these amendments, the use 
of AD law exploded. During the years following these amendments, AD filings 
surged, averaging  forty-five  to  fifty  cases  per  year,  and  the  rejection  rate 
dropped to about 50 percent. 
The point of this historical background is to emphasize that AD is a malle- 
able, frequently amended statute. AD law is now the most widely used trade 
statute primarily because congressional amendments have made the statute far 
more applicable than it was in the 1960s and 1970s. The kinds of pricing be- 
havior that are sanctionable under AD have changed over the years. And, im- 
portantly, usually these changes are in response to complaints from U.S. indus- 
tries who find the current implementation of the law unsatisfactory. One would 
expect, then, that  the country-specific  nature  of  AD protection  would  be  a 
prime target for change. However, GATT guidelines prevent Congress from 
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A  more  creative  solution  was  needed, and  the  “cumulation”  amendment 
contained in the Trade and Tariff Act of 1984 is a significant step in the direc- 
tion of making AD protection more comprehensive. The cumulation provision 
requires the International Trade Commission (ITC) to cumulate imports when 
a trade dispute involves imports from multiple  sources. Without cumulation, 
imports are evaluated on a country-by-country basis when determining injury; 
when  cumulation  is applied, the ITC aggregates  all ‘‘like’’ imports from all 
countries under investigation and assesses the combined effect on the domes- 
tic industry. 
When Congress was debating whether to mandate cumulation, the issue of 
diversion was never mentioned.  Rather, the stated reason for the amendment 
was that the source of the dumped or subsidized imports was irrelevant. What 
mattered was that the cumulated volume was injurious. This argument in favor 
of cumulation has been referred to as the “hammering effect” since, according 
to industries and their representatives, “a domestic industry that suffers mate- 
rial injury by  reason of  100,000 tons of unfairly traded imports from a single 
country is injured to the same degree by 20,000 tons of unfairly traded imports 
from each of  five different countries” (Suder 1983,470-71). The main goal of 
mandated cumulation was to reduce the rejection rate at the ITC. Hansen and 
Prusa (in press) find that  this has indeed been the result; they estimate that 
cumulation increases the probability of an affirmative injury determination by 
20-30 percent and has changed the ITC’s decision (from negative to affirma- 
tive) for about one-third of cumulated cases. 
Cumulation may also have important implications for import diversion. For 
instance, if (i) cumulation increases the number of multiple petition filings and 
(ii) the greater the number of countries named in the petition, the less signifi- 
cant will be the import diversion, then cumulation will effectively make AD 
law  more  comprehensive.  The first part  of  the hypothesis  is clearly  correct 
since, during the years following mandated cumulation,  there has been  a 50 
percent increase in multiple petition filings. The second part of the hypothesis 
is an issue we will want to examine in this paper (i.e., Is diversion less im- 
portant when more countries are named?). 
7.1.2  Related Research 
The popularity of AD law has spurred a large body of literature, both theo- 
retical and empirical, but none has focused specifically on the issue of diver- 
sion. The theoretical research on AD law has focused on its strategic and incen- 
tive  effects.’  Broadly  speaking, the  empirical  literature  on AD law  can  be 
divided  into two groups. One line of  research is based on Baldwin’s (1985) 
3. Depending on the precise model specification, AD law can induce a rich variety of  strategic 
effects. For example, in Anderson (1992), the threat of an AD duty induces foreign firms to behave 
more competitively, while, in  Staiger and Wolak (19911, Leidy  (1993), and Prusa (1994), AD 
lam can facilitate collusion. Fischer (1992) points out that the nature of the strategic competition 
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seminal work on the determinants of administered pr~tection.~  Another group 
of papers empirically estimates the effects of antidumping cases5  However, a 
shortcoming of virtually all the empirical papers is that estimates are based on 
aggregated data, typically four-digit  Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) 
industry data. For example, Lichtenberg and Tan (1994) estimate the effects of 
AD cases, but their estimates are for all SIC-level imports (i.e., from all source 
countries). Given that AD protection is country specific, their aggregated ap- 
proach will not measure the important trade creation and diversion that are a 
fundamental characteristic of AD protection. 
An important exception is Krupp and Pollard (1992), which examines the 
effects of AD actions in the chemical industry using monthly Tariff Schedules 
of the United States Annotated (TSUSA) level import data. Krupp and Pol- 
lard’s use of disaggregated  data allows them to examine the effect of AD ac- 
tions on the chemical industry. However, since they collect disaggregated data 
for only a single industry, they cannot address the general issue of diversion. 
Staiger and Wolak (1994) also control for the aggregation issue caused by 
using  SIC-level  data  by  normalizing  SIC-level imports  with the number of 
TSUSA codes under investigation in each SIC category.  Staiger and Wolak 
estimate trade effects of AD investigation, with particular emphasis on the fil- 
ing and investigation effects. Even though their estimates are based  on SIC 
data, Staiger and Wolak are still able to find evidence of import diversion and 
in general find that the restraint on overall imports is about one-third to half as 
much as on imports from the named country. 
7.2  The Trade Effects of AD Actions 
7.2.1  The Data 
In order to examine the trade effects of AD cases, time-series trade data for 
each AD case needed to be constructed. To do this, I collected the line-item 
tariff  codes named for each of the 428 AD petitions filed between 1980 and 
1988. The product codes and the estimated AD duties are found the Federal 
Register notices accompanying  each determination  made by the Department 
of Commerce and the ITC. 
Until  1988, products  were usually  identified by their  seven-digit TSUSA 
code. In a significant number of cases, the products  were identified by  their 
five-digit TSUSA code. Because of this difference, and in order to reduce the 
number of missing values due to the numerous changes in the TSUSA codes, 
I aggregated  all seven-digit codes to their five-digit equivalent. In  1989, the 
1.  Moore (1992). Baldwin and Steagall (1994). and Hansen and Prusa (in press) all focus on 
the determination of International Trade Commission decisions. A large number of other related 
papers are cited therein. 
5. Work  in this area includes Finger, Hall, and Nelson (1982). Harrison (1991), and Hartigan, 
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United  States adopted the Harmonized Tariff Schedule (HTS). Therefore, in 
order to extend the time series beyond 1988, the TSUSA codes were concorded 
with their corresponding HTS codes. Once the TSUSA codes were collected, 
import trade data for those products under investigation were extracted from 
the Commerce Department’s annual import trade data by  source country. Im- 
ports were deflated using the GNP price deflator. Time series for the products 
involved in each case were constructed from 1978 to 1993. 
Other work has shown that  settled cases can  have a significant effect  on 
trade (Prusa 1992; Staiger and Wolak 1994).  However, to narrow the analysis, 
I chose to exclude settled cases in the present analysis and thus compare import 
diversion in cases that are rejected with diversion in those that result in duties. 
After dropping cases where only incomplete data series could be constructed, 
the data set is composed of  109 rejected  cases and  126 cases where  duties 
were levied.h 
The diversity of AD cases complicates matters since trade volume in some 
cases amounts to only a few million dollars while in others the trade volume 
is in the hundreds of millions of dollars. To control for these vast differences, 
I plot all variables as percentage changes relative to their value in the year the 
petition was filed (year to).’ The year following the petition is denoted t,,  the 
year after that  tZ,  etc. Except under unusual circumstances,  the case must be 
decided within one year, so, during year t,,  imports are being investigated. 
7.2.2  Filing Behavior: A Look at the Countries Investigated 
The set of countries subject to AD investigations between  1980 and 1988 is 
comprehensive: over fifty countries representing all major U.S. trading partners 
were subject to investigation. The bulk of  cases were against developed coun- 
tries and the export-oriented growth countries such as South Korea and Taiwan, 
but countries as small as Trinidad and Tobago, Bangladesh, and Iran were also 
subject to AD investigations. In table 7.1, the countries most frequently named 
in AD petitions are listed. As is readily apparent, the countries at the top of the 
list constitute virtually all important U.S. trading partners. 
In addition,  I include  the percentage  of  each country’s  cases resulting  in 
duties. Between  1980 and  1988, about one-third of AD petitions resulted  in 
duties, one-third resulted in settlements, and one-third were rejected. In gen- 
eral, the countries appearing in this table are representative of the general inci- 
dence of  duties.  In  the  final  column, I  give information  about  the number 
of cases where the listed country was active in an import market that was sub- 
ject to an AD investigation but where that country was not named. For instance, 
6. Incomplete data series can arise if a product‘s TSUSA code changes (with  the result that only 
partial time series could be constructed) or the TSUSA-HTS concordance is unsatisfactory. 
7.  I  also adjusted the trends  for macroeconomic trends by measuring  relative to  changes in 
overall merchandise trade. The results are qualitatively the same as those presented here and are 
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Table 7.1  Countries Most Frequently Named in AD Investigations 
Countrq 
No. of Cases  % of Cases Resulting  No. of Cases Exporting to 





















































Japanese  industries  were  named  as  alleged  dumpers in  fifty-two  cases,  of 
which seventeen (33 percent) resulted in duties. In 112 other AD cases, Japan 
exported to the U.S. market but was not the country subject to investigation. 
As I discuss in section 7.3, in these cases, Japanese firms potentially stood to 
benefit from U.S. AD actions. If AD duties are levied, some other country (a 
rival) would be subject to duties, thereby giving Japanese firms an opportunity 
to expand their sales in the U.S. market. 
7.2.3  Named Country Imports 
The first issue is the effect of AD actions on imports from the named coun- 
try. In figure 7.1, I present changes in the value of imports. The trends look as 
one would have expected. On average, when duties are levied, trade from the 
named country is restricted, especially in comparison to when the case is re- 
jected. In year t,,  import trade from the named country (when duties are levied) 
was 9 percent less than it was in to and 16 percent less than import trade from 
named  countries  in rejected  cases. In year t2,  import trade from the named 
country  (when duties are levied) was 25 percent  less than  trade in rejected 
cases. While these numbers suggest that AD duties have a substantial effect on 
trade, at least from the named country, it should be noted that the largest re- 
striction appears to occur in the very short run. By t,, trade from the named 
country (when duties are levied) is already rebounding, and by t,, trade exceeds 
its prepetition level. 
The size of the duty plays a key role in how restrictive an AD case is. In 
figure  7.1 I also compare those  cases that  are  subject  to duties  in the  top 
quartile (i.e., duties greater than 36 percent) with those subject to duties in the 
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Fig. 7.1  Value of imports (named country) 
these two sets of  cases, the restrictive effect of AD actions  is more marked. 
For instance, we find that import trade from the named country falls by  47 
percent during the first year for countries subject to very high AD duties. By 
contrast, cases subject to small duties  apparently  experience no perceptible 
decline in import trade-and,  in fact, imports grow by almost 10 percent dur- 
ing the first year following the petition. 
While it seems surprising that named imports would grow when duties are 
levied, this result highlights a unique characteristic of AD protection. If an AD 
duty is levied and the named country raises its U.S. market price by the full 
amount of the duty (holding home market prices constant), the assigned duty 
will never in  fact have to be paid. In this case, the AD duty serves to create a 
price floor for the named country’s products. This characteristic likely is part 
of  the explanation  for why  small  duties  might  be beneficial  for the  named 
country. The other key reason is the fact that firms competing noncooperatively 
typically find that competition forces them to cut their price and that, if they 
could somehow reduce the incentive to undercut their rivals, they would benefit 
from  higher  prices.  Since AD duties are essentially  government-mandated 
price floors, and since small duties will raise the named country’s AD-distorted 
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Fig. 7.2  Value of imports (named country),  case rejected 
that the primary effect of AD duties is the creation of desirable coordination 
benefits. 
It is also instructive to look at imports from named countries in high- and 
low-duty cases when duties are not levied. In figure 7.2, I depict trade patterns 
for rejected AD cases. What is interesting is that, even when duties are never 
levied, imports often fall during the investigation. For instance, in cases where 
high  duties  are threatened  (but  ultimately  rejected),  trade  from the  named 
country  falls by  almost 20 percent during the  investigation.  This finding is 
consistent with Staiger and Wolak’s (1994) finding that there is a substantial 
“investigation” effect to an AD petition. It is not surprising that the investiga- 
tion effect is most apparent for high-duty cases. This effect stems from the fact 
that, once the Commerce Department makes its preliminary duty calculation, 
duties are collected (as a bond) pending the final outcome of the investigation. 
If the case is ultimately rejected, the bond is returned. But, during the investi- 
gation,  the  required  bonding  creates considerable uncertainty  as to the  true 
price of the goods. Once the case is resolved, the uncertainty is resolved, and 
the investigation effect disappears: imports from named countries (especially 
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7.3.4  Imports from Nonnamed Countries 
Even though successful AD actions restrict imports from the named country, 
the countries that are not subject to the investigation can offset this restraint by 
increasing their sales to the United States. This potential diversionary effect of 
AD actions is, indeed, observed. In figure 7.3, the value of imports from non- 
named  countries  is depicted. The diversion of  trade is large, not only when 
duties are levied, but also when the case is rejected. In fact, surprisingly, we 
find that diversion is even more substantial when duties are not levied. 
On average, imports from nonnamed countries grow by  22 percent in year 
r,. In addition, we find that the diversion is greater for high-duty cases than for 
low-duty cases. This pattern makes sense given that, in figures 7.1 and 7.2, we 
saw that the AD actions have a more substantial effect on the named country’s 
imports in high-duty cases than in low-duty cases. For cases where high duties 
are imposed, nonnamed countries increase their imports 30 percent by year tz 
and 40 percent  by  year t,.  Diversion  is still substantial when low duties are 
levied, averaging  15-20 percent during each of the first three years following 
the petition. 
In  figure 7.4, 1 again depict imports from nonnamed countries when duties 
are levied, but here I control for the number of  countries named in the petition. 
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Fig. 7.4  Value of imports (nonnamed countries), duties levied 
try is named. In the first year following a petition, nonnamed imports grew by 
35 percent when a single country was named, as compared to 4 percent growth 
when three or more countries are named. This pattern in the amount of diver- 
sion persists throughout the years following the case. 
7.2.5  Overall Imports 
In  figure 7.5, the effect on imports (in the investigated product categories) 
from all source countries is depicted. Two trends emerge. First, the trade effect 
of AD actions is far less substantial for overall imports than for imports from 
the named country. For instance,  in year  ?,,  imports from the named country 
fall by  11 percent when duties are levied. At the same time (year t,),  however, 
overall imports increase  by  15 percent. In  year  t2, imports  from the named 
country  are still down 9 percent,  but overall imports increase by  11 percent. 
Interestingly, a similar pattern emerges for cases that are rejected. For example, 
imports from the named country increase by  5 percent in year t,, but overall 
imports increase by  19 percent. Clearly, the ability of nonnamed countries to 
increase imports destined for the United States softens the restrictions imposed 
by AD duties. Second, diversion does not imply that AD duties have no effect 
on overall import trade. Overall import growth for cases where duties are lev- 
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few years following the AD petition. Taken together, these results indicate that 
attempts to understand  the effect of AD actions will surely fail if one looks 
only at the effects on import trade from the named country. While AD duties 
do reduce overall import growth, the effect is more muted than the reduction 
in imports from the named country. 
In figure 7.6, I focus only on cases where duties are levied and again exam- 
ine imports from all source countries. But the difference here is that I control 
for the number of  countries named in the petition. In figure 7.4, we saw that 
there is less diversion when three or more countries were named. By contrast, 
here we see that, overall, imports are not  so systematically  affected  by  the 
number  of  named countries. During  the first two years following  the filing, 
petitions with at least three named countries do appear to have very little im- 
port growth, but thereafter overall imports grow more rapidly than in petitions 
with only a single country. While it is not clear why this is the case, it does 
reinforce the notion that looking only at the effect of AD on the named country 
will surely be misleading. 
7.2.6  The Effect on Unit Values and Quantities 
Underlying the changes in imports are changes in prices (unit values) and 
quantities. In figure 7.7, the effect of AD actions on unit values (as charged by 
the named country) is depicted. The results are precisely what one would ex- Number named = 1 
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Fig. 7.6  Value of imports (total), duties levied 
Time 





L  m 
K 
E -1  0% -  e 
g -20% - 






4  Duties Levied 







I  Duties Levied 
-50%  1  I  1  I  I  I  I 
to  t+l  t+2  t+3  t+4  t+5 
Time 
Fig. 7.8  Quantity (named country) 
pect. Unit values rise more for cases resulting in duties than for cases that are 
rejected. For instance, by year t,, unit values have risen more than twice as much 
when duties are levied as when they are not. In addition, unit values rise more 
quickly for cases with high duties than for cases with low duties. For instance, 
by year t3,  unit values for cases with the highest duties have risen by more than 
100 percent since the case was filed; by contrast, in the same period of time, 
unit values for cases with the lowest duties have risen by  about 40 percent. 
Figure 7.8 depicts the quantity effect of  AD duties. Again, the results are 
exactly what one would expect to find. We see that quantities fall by more (i) 
when duties are levied than when the case is rejected and (ii) when high duties 
are levied than when low duties are levied. 
Combining the results depicted in figures 7.3, 7.7, and 7.8, we have a set of 
patterns that are consistent with the conjecture that AD cases that result in low 
duties serve as a facilitating practice.  Cases with low duties still experience 
import growth, rising prices, and increasing quantity of sales. Recall that low- 
duiy cuses are defined as having AD duties less than 7 percent. Remember also 
that, unlike tariffs, the named country can avoid paying AD duties if it raises 
its U.S. prices by the full duty amount. A mandated price floor that is only a 
small amount greater than current prices could easily allow the foreign firm to 205  The Trade Effects of U.S. Antidumping Actions 
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price more like a Stackelberg leader. It is reasonable to believe that the U.S. 
industry benefits from higher prices by foreign firms, and, therefore,  in this 
scenario, the AD provides coordination benefits for the rivals. 
In a typical model of strategic interaction, other firms in the market respond 
to price  increases by  one party. We would  expect to observe  such strategic 
interactions  in response to AD-induced price changes. In figure 7.9, I depict 
the unit values for the named country and also for nonnamed countries. (For 
each case, the nonnamed country’s unit value was calculated using a weighted 
average of the individual countries’ imports.) 
The results  again are clearly consistent with what would  be predicted  by 
theory: as the named country’s unit values increase, the nonnamed countries’ 
unit values increase, but in general by a somewhat smaller amount (60-70 per- 
cent of  the named country’s change). This trend is found both when cases are 
rejected and when cases result in duties. This is consistent with the notion that 
price effects of AD investigation cascade to nonnamed countries. In this re- 
spect, AD law is quite effective. The price increases induced by an AD action 
spur price increases by other foreign rivals. 
Finally, in figure 7.10, the effect of duties on unit values is depicted, control- 
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Fig. 7.10  Unit value (named country), duties levied 
run, it appears that the number of named countries does not significantly affect 
the price increases induced by duties. However, in the longer run (greater than 
three years), it does appear to matter. 
7.2.7  Estimation Results 
In table 7.2, I present OLS regression results for named imports, nonnamed 
imports, and overall imports. The basic specification is 
In Y  = a + Po  In .x!,-,  + f3, In(x, I-,/xz  ,-2)  + P,NumNamed, 
+ PJn Duty, + p,(Dec,  In Duty,) + P,t,  + @,(t,Dec,) 
+ P,Year,,,  j  = 0,.  . . , 5. 
'  11 
The variable x  , ,  denotes imports for case i at time t,, where to  corresponds to 
the year the petifion was filed, t,  to the period of investigation, and t, . . . t, are 
the years following the outcome. The variable Duty, denotes the size of the 
duty.x Given the discussion above, we might expect the number of countries 
X. Recall that, even if  a case is ultimately rejected, a duty level is estimated by the Commerce 
Department. Until the final ITC injury determination, duties are collected (as a bond) pending the 
final outcome of the investigation. If  the case is ultimately rejected, the bond is returned. 207  The Trade Effects of US. Antidumping Actions 
named (NumNamed,) to have an effect (= 1 when three or more countries are 
named). The variable  Dec, is a decision dummy (=  I  if  duties are levied). 
Calendar year dummies (Year, ) are included in the estimation to control for 
macroeconomic trends. 
A number of the general trends depicted in the figures also emerge from the 
regressions. Consider first the effect on imports from the named country. The 
estimated duty effect is negative  and significant. The restriction  when duties 
are levied (-0.158  = -0.055  -  0.103) is about three times as large as the 
restriction  stemming from the  investigation  effect  alone (-0.055). Results 
from an alternative specification where a dummy variable is used to capture 
the duty effect are also reported. In this specification, the restrictions from low 
and high duties  are estimated (relative to moderate duties). Notice  that low 
duties appear to have little effect on import trade, especially  if  the case does 
not result in duties. This result is consistent with the notion that the main effect 
of small AD duties is beneficial coordination.  On the other hand, high duties 
have a large negative effect on imports, especially when duties are levied. Sec- 
ond, note that, in both specifications, the effect of an AD investigation is quite 
long-lived. The time effects are negative and quite large, although  most are 
insignificantly estimated. 
The results for nonnamed imports help characterize the amount of import 
diversion. Broadly speaking, the results are consistent with the trends depicted 
in the figures. We find, for instance, that diversion is greater for cases that are 
rejected (the time-decision cross-effect coefficients are all negative). We also 
find that, the larger the duties, the more diversion there is, especially for re- 
jected cases. Interestingly, we find that, after controlling for other effects, di- 
version seems to increase in the number of countries named, a result that bears 
further study in future work. 
The results for overall imports suggest that import diversion mitigates most, 
if not all, of the effect of AD actions on the value of imports. For instance, note 
that overall imports increase  in cases where no duties are levied. The time- 
effect dummies are all positive. However, overall imports do fall for cases that 
result in duties: the estimated decision-duties and decision-time  cross-effects 
are all positive.  On net, AD duties do cause overall  imports  to fall, but the 
restriction is far less than the restriction to named country imports. 
J 
7.3  Net Country Effects of U.S. AD Actions 
Interestingly, the import diversion induced by AD actions implies that many 
foreign countries benefit from aggressive US. use of AD law. On average, it 
seems reasonable to believe  that countries that  are named  will tend to lose 
from AD actions while those that are not named will in general benefit. Thus, 
although the countries  listed in table 7.1 were  all frequently subject to AD 
investigations, they were also active in many product categories where some 


























































































































Cross-effect: Years X  decision 
t + 1  X affirmative 
t + 2  X affirmative 
t + 3 X  affirmative 
t + 4 X affirmative 
t + 5  X affirmative 
Adjusted R’ 
Number of  observations 
-.433 
(.  161 )** 
p.366 
(.161)** 
-  ,266 
(.162) 
-  .224 
(.162) 
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Nore: Standard errors are given in parentheses. Calendar year dummies are estimated but not reported. ***, **, and * indicate significance at  I, 5, and 10 percent, re- 
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factors  of AD duties  may  not  be the  U.S. complainant  but  rather  the  other 
countries competing in the U.S. market. If import diversion were complete and 
the price effects small, the U.S. industry that spent hundreds of thousands of 
dollars (if not millions)  assembling the forms, mobilizing  disparate firms to 
provide information, lobbying congressmen, and incurring all the other sundry 
expenses associated with filing a petition might receive little or no gain. 
Using the estimates reported in table 7.2,  we can measure the effect of AD 
duties. In particular, when a country is named, we can estimate the value of 
imports with the duty and also what imports would  have been if duties had 
never  been  levied. The difference is the effect  of AD duties for the named 
country in that case. If we sum the trade effects over all cases where a country 
was named, a measure of  the AD duties-induced trade contraction can be con- 
structed. 
Similarly, using the estimates on nonnamed  imports, we can estimate the 
value of  nonnamed imports with the duty and also what nonnamed imports 
would have been had duties never been levied. The difference is the effect of 
AD duties for the nonnamed country. Summing over all nonnamed countries 
would yield the total diversion for that case. If we sum the trade diversion over 
all cases where a country was not named (but was actively exporting to the 
United States), a measure of  the AD duties-induced  trade expansion can be 
constructed. 
In table 7.3,  I report the results from performing such calculations using the 
changes in imports between t,, and t,  as the measure of the trade effect. Clearly, 
this measure does not capture all trade effects of AD actions since it does not 
control for what trade patterns would have been without any AD activity, but 
it nonetheless highlights the idea that the distortions caused by AD law can be 
either a blessing or a curse.’ 
In the upper part of the table, I list the countries that have suffered the great- 
est trade contraction when named in U.S. AD actions (and subject to duties). 
Japan, the most frequently named country, easily tops the list as the country 
whose trade has fallen the most as a result of U.S. AD duties (total estimated 
losses of $7.6 billion). Note, however, that I estimate that Japan’s exports to the 
United States increase by more than $5 billion, yielding a net trade contraction 
of  about $2 billion. The other countries on the list all suffer sizable import 
losses (when named), but far less than Japan. It is interesting to note that all 
the remaining countries, except Iran, are estimated to have a net gain in trade 
with the United States despite their losses in cases where duties were levied. 
Of particular  interest is the fact that Canada is estimated  to be a net gainer 
from AD duties. Given the highly visible nature of  many Canadian-U.S. AD 
disputes, this is somewhat surprising. However, it does serve as a reminder that 
politics rather than economics is often more important in explaining the ten- 
sions created by a trade suit. 
9. In addition, the calculation does not include any trade distortions from those cases that were 
settled. 211  The Trade Effects of  U.S.  Antidumping Actions 
Table 7.3  Effect of US.  Antidumping Activity 
When Named  When Not Named 
A Imports,  A Imports, 
%A,  t,andt,  B A,  t,,andt, 
to and t,  ($millions)  t,  and t,  ($millions) 
Countries with the largest trade contraction (when named): 
Japan  -20.37  -7,654  13.46 
Brazil  -  13.43  -201  17.99 
Italy  -13.48  -184  18.31 
South Korea  -8.01  -117  17.62 
France  -8.07  -109  17.94 
United Kingdom  -  11.56  -69  18.31 
Taiwan  -5.41  -65  17.29 
Canada  -6.31  -47  18.98 
Soviet Union  -25.42  -  44  5.42 
Iran  -62.52  -  23  .I1 
People’s Republic of China  -  14.33  -  23  9.46 
Countries with the largest trade expansion (when not named): 
Belgium  -6.14  -1  18.12 
Netherlands  -  13.99  -4  18.05 
Austria  ...  ...  18.25 
Switzerland  ...  ...  17.88 
Australia  -26.00  -2  17.92 
Spain  -8.56  -14  17.98 
Denmark  ...  ...  17.84 
Mexico  2.74  4  17.91 
United Kingdom  -  1 I .56  -69  18.31 















































In the bottom  part of the table, I list the ten countries  that experience the 
greatest trade expansion as a result of U.S. AD actions. All the countries on 
this list are estimated to experience a net gain of over $20 billion as a result of 
duties being levied on other countries. 
7.4  Concluding Comments 
Overall,  the evidence presented  in this paper  suggests that  the protection 
offered by AD law is significantly offset by  the ability of alternative foreign 
suppliers  to increase their  shipments destined  for the  United  States. Even 
though imports from named countries are restricted, especially for those cases 
with high duties, most of the protective effect of  AD duties is offset by  the 
increased trading activity of nonnamed countries. 
The results also suggest that the country-specific nature of AD protection is 
an important factor both in explaining the surge in AD actions during the 1980s 
and in evaluating the protective effect of AD actions. In conjunction with previ- 
ous work  on the effect of the cumulation amendment (Hansen and Prusa in 
press), the results in the paper are consistent with the view that the surge in 212  Thomas J. Prusa 
AD filings during the 1980s is a strategic attempt to compensate for the limited 
nature of AD protection and is not evidence of an increase in injurious pricing 
by foreign competitors. 
The fact that almost three hundred AD cases have been filed during the first 
half of the 1990s leaves little doubt that U.S.  firms will continue to use AD law 
frequently to reduce import competition. The results in this paper suggest that, 
unless the popularity of multiple petition filings increases the overall share of 
imports investigated, the other foreign suppliers will mitigate the losses caused 
by AD protection. 
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